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Breslawski: The Retroactivity of Padilla

“BUT MY ATTORNEY DIDN’T TELL ME I’D BE
DEPORTED!”—THE RETROACTIVITY OF PADILLA
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Chaidez v. United States1
(decided February 20, 2013)
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A.

The Sixth Amendment

A defendant’s right to assistance of counsel in a criminal
prosecution is a right so fundamental that the Founding Fathers included it in the Bill of Rights.2 This protection derives from the
Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, providing in pertinent part
that the accused shall “have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”3 This guarantee exists as a mechanism to ensure that the
criminally accused receive a fair trial.4 The right is so important that
appointed counsel is available to every defendant who cannot afford
retained counsel to defend the criminal charges brought against
them.5 Notwithstanding the inherent guarantees afforded by the Sixth
Amendment, there is no assurance that counsel will effectively preserve the defendant’s rights.6 However, because the right exists to afford a defendant a fair trial, the Sixth Amendment is interpreted as
guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of counsel.7 In order to
determine whether an attorney’s performance has failed to meet this
“effective” threshold, the United States Supreme Court initially set
the benchmark for ineffective assistance of counsel at arising where
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 686.
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“counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [consequently,] the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.”8 However, through more recent case
law, the Supreme Court has refined the test used to determine whether counsel’s representation has met the threshold, thereby upholding
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.
B.

Ineffective Assistance Claims as a Result of
Deportation – Strickland v. Washington and Padilla
v. Kentucky

“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”9 Although
a defendant may spend time independently researching his charges
and potential defenses after he is arrested for a crime, this is hardly
equivalent to the knowledge and experience of an attorney. However, there is little difference between a defendant doing research for his
own case and an attorney claiming to represent a defendant, but failing to provide any actual assistance.10 Thus, it is imperative in preserving the quality of and pursuing justice in our judicial system, that
the criminally accused not merely be afforded the right to counsel,
but rather, “the right to . . . the effective assistance of counsel.”11
In Strickland v. Washington,12 the Court established a twoprong test that is still used in all ineffective assistance of counsel
claims today. The first prong requires that the defendant show counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.13 A defendant may
satisfy this prong by evidence that counsel made serious, fundamental
errors such that the Sixth Amendment “counsel” guarantee was not
fulfilled.14 Once a defendant has shown that the “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under
prevailing professional norms,”15 the claim is analyzed under to the
second part of the test. The second prong requires a showing that
8

Id.
Id. at 684.
10
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
11
Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)) (emphasis
added).
12
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
13
Id. at 687.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 688.
9
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counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.16 A defendant may satisfy this requirement by showing that, but for the
counsel’s deficient performance, the trial would have had a different
outcome.17 In contrast, a defendant may not satisfy the second prong
by merely demonstrating that counsel made an error in the course of
representation, if that error had no bearing on the outcome of the proceeding.18 Once the two Strickland prongs are satisfied, a court will
likely find that the defendant’s counsel did not provide the defendant
with the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
In a recent landmark case, Padilla v. Kentucky,19 the Court
took Strickland one step further when faced with the question of
whether counsel’s failure to discuss deportation consequences of a
guilty plea with a defendant could give rise to a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.20 Prior to Padilla, deportation had long been
considered a collateral consequence, and thus, not a factor within the
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.21 However,
the Court in Padilla recognized that the Strickland two-prong test of
effective assistance of counsel failed to distinguish between direct
and collateral consequences.22 Although deportation is a severe penalty that often accompanies criminal convictions, it is a civil consequence in nature, and thus, was not considered a direct consequence
protected by the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.23 Ultimately, in Padilla, the Court concluded that because
immigration consequences are so closely connected to a criminal
conviction, it is likely they are direct and therefore defendants are entitled to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel in advising of
those potential consequences.24
At the heart of the Court’s ruling was its careful consideration
of the severity of removal from the country, which makes advising a
defendant of deportation as either a mandatory, or even possible, consequence of pleading guilty, inextricably related to the accused’s

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 687.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Id. at 691.
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id. at 1481.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1482.
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right to assistance of counsel.25 The Court noted that while every attorney might not be familiar with the immigration consequences accompanying criminal charges, counsel is nonetheless expected to become acquainted with the law, potential consequences of the charges,
and if necessary, research the potential of deportation.26 The Court
also addressed the potential floodgate issue and whether this decision
would have an impact on convictions previously obtained by guilty
pleas that resulted in deportation. The majority proposed that because lower courts have applied the Strickland test for years, these
courts should not have a problem altering it to include this new
standard.27 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that it has been the
professional norm for attorneys to inform their clients when there is a
potential for deportation, and thus, there should not be an influx of
appeals claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on Padilla.28
As the subsequent history of Padilla shows, the majority was quite
wrong with their hypothesis.
C.

Writ of Coram Nobis

The writ of coram nobis is encompassed within the All Writs
Act and “provides a method for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction when a defendant is not in custody, and thus, cannot proceed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”29 A court will allow the use of this writ only when there is a continuing “civil disability resulting from a conviction” that requires collateral relief.30 A circuit court has also described the use of this writ as limited to “extraordinary” cases when
the error is fundamental and there is no other available remedy. 31 In
order to seek this writ as a form of relief, the petitioner must show:
“(1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for
not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist
from the conviction to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of
Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character.”32
Because of the uniqueness of deportation proceedings as a
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
Id.
Id. at 1485.
Id.
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id.
United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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consequence to guilty pleas, this writ is the most commonly sought
remedy in the federal system for claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Immigration removal proceedings often do not begin until
after a person is released from his or her custodial sentence, and
therefore, the normal remedy of appeal is not available.33 In the cases
where the defendant is given incorrect advice or is not advised on the
matter of deportation at all, there is no reason for a defendant to attack the conviction prior to the commencement of immigration proceedings, and thus, the writ should be available as a remedy. 34 Removal from the country would clearly be considered an adverse
consequence such that it would satisfy the Article III requirement.35
Finally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may require a caseby-case determination to analyze whether the attorney’s error was so
serious that it prejudiced the defendant, and thus, whether the defendant is entitled to relief under the writ.36 It appears in most cases that
the first three factors would be satisfied for a defendant seeking relief
from ineffective assistance under this writ and the ultimate decision
will rest on the graveness of the attorney’s error.
II.

RETROACTIVITY OF “NEW” AND “OLD” RULES – TEAGUE V.
LANE

In Teague v. Lane,37 the Court explained that “[r]etroactivity
is . . . a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires
that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”38
However, the determination of whether a rule is a “new rule” is not
simple. The Court held, generally speaking, a rule is “new” when it
“breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government.”39 In other words, when a rule is not “dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became
final” it will be considered “new.”40 If the Court does determine that
a “new rule” has been established, this rule will only apply to cases
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.
Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 252-53.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id.
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on direct review and will apply to cases on collateral review in two
limited circumstances.41 The two exceptions to refusing to retroactively apply the “new rule” to collateral appeals are when the rule is
“substantive” or when it is a “ ‘watershed rul[e] of the criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding.”42 In Teague, the Court stated the idea of finality in the justice system was the driving force behind denying retroactivity to a “new rule” and “[w]ithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”43
To the contrary, a rule is considered an “old rule” if a “court
considering the defendant’s claim at the time his conviction became
final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution.”44 If the rule
is classified as an “old rule,” it is applied retroactively to cases on
both collateral and direct appeal.45
Unfortunately there is a lack of clarity among the courts because the determination of whether a rule is “new” or “old” becomes
exceedingly difficult when it appears that the rule simply extends the
reasoning of a prior case.46 In Padilla, it is clear that the main question before the Court was whether Padilla’s counsel was ineffective
and fell below the objective standard of reasonableness as set forth by
Strickland.47 Because Padilla has its foundations in Strickland, both
district and circuit courts across the country are split on whether Padilla’s decision to include a failure to warn about immigration consequences of a guilty plea as a violation of Sixth Amendment rights
was just an extension of the Strickland decision or was an entirely
new rule.48

41

Id. at 303; Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688.
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688 (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (citations omitted)).
43
Teague, 489 U.S. at 309; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not
the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man
shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.”).
44
United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting O’Dell,
III v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (internal quotation omitted)).
45
Id. at 1153.
46
Id. at 1154.
47
Id.
48
See Chaidez, 655 F.3d 684; see also cases cited infra section III.
42
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RETROACTIVITY IN FEDERAL CIRCUITS
A.

Third Circuit

In Mendoza v. United States,49 Mario Mendoza was an Ecuadorian immigrant and resided in New Jersey.50 While working as a
licensed realtor, the government charged him with “conspiring to
fraudulently induce the Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgage loans.”51 Mendoza’s counsel advised him that jail time could be
avoided through a guilty plea, but failed to mention that pleading
guilty to an aggravated felony would also carry a mandatory deportation consequence.52 Mendoza entered the guilty plea in March 2006,
and subsequently learned prior to his sentencing that he may be subject to removal from the country.53 After he was sentenced, the government began the deportation process and he was forced to leave the
country.54
Mendoza filed a motion pursuant to Title 28, Section 2255 in
an attempt to have his sentence vacated and guilty plea withdrawn.55
In this motion, he claimed his counsel did not advise him of the potential deportation consequences of his guilty plea and this could be
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.56 Shortly after Mendoza submitted this motion, the decision in Padilla was rendered, and
Mendoza accordingly withdrew his motion and filed a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis, once again claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel.57 In that petition, Mendoza stated that he would not have
pled guilty if he had known of the immigration consequences of that
plea.58
The District Court found Mendoza to have unduly delayed in
filing his petition for ineffective assistance of counsel, but Mendoza
contended that this delay was due to the absence of Supreme Court
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

690 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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precedent at the time of his plea.59 The Third Circuit found that regardless of his delay in filing the petition, Padilla did not apply retroactively because it did not create a “new rule.”60 In that Circuit, attorneys had always been expected to advise defendants of the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.61 “More importantly, the
government would certainly be unduly prejudiced by the reprosecution of a case involving facts nearly a decade dormant.”62
B.

Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit addressed an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in United States v. Akinsade.63 Akinsade was a Nigerian immigrant who became a legal permanent resident in the United
States in 2000.64 Shortly before he became a legal resident, he was
charged with embezzlement while working as a bank teller. 65 During
the plea proceedings, Akinsade raised the issue of immigration consequences at least twice to his attorney.66 The attorney gave incorrect
advice to both inquisitions and assured Akinsade that he could not be
deported based on this one offense.67 Based on this assurance,
Akinsade pled guilty and was ultimately subject to immigration proceedings nine years later, based on the embezzlement conviction.68
Accordingly, Akinsade sought a writ of coram nobis, claiming he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s misadvice.69
In analyzing whether Akinsade was in fact prejudiced, the
court distinguished his situation from the defendant’s situation in
United States v. Foster.70 In Foster, the court found that Foster was
not prejudiced by his counsel’s misadvice because the judge gave a
detailed and explicit explanation of the severity of his sentence during a hearing.71 Unlike Foster, the judge did not give Akinsade a de59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159-60.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id. at 161.
686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 250-51.
Id. at 251.
68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 88.
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tailed explanation informing him that his plea mandated deportation;72 instead, the judge only advised that it may lead to deportation.73 Because the judge’s explanation in Akinsade was not as explicit as the one in Foster, the court found it was reasonable for
Akinsade to continue to rely on his counsel’s advice.74 The court justified its decision explaining that “[i]f a district court’s admonishment
so happens to correct the deficient performance then there is no prejudice; however, if there is no correction, then our scrutiny is not directed toward the district court but appropriately to the constitutional
offender.”75 Therefore, because the district court did not fix the attorney’s misadvice, and Akinsade clearly was concerned about the
potential immigration consequences of his plea, as evidenced by his
inquisitions, Akinsade was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of
counsel.76 Affirmative misrepresentations regarding the deportability
of a defendant results in ineffective assistance, a fundamental error
that may be relieved through a writ of coram nobis.77 In a footnote,
the court recognized that because neither party disagreed that the
misadvice satisfied Strickland’s first prong of constitutionally deficient assistance, it would not address whether Padilla was retroactively applicable to Akinsade’s case.78
C.

Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit has decided two cases on this issue, United
States v. Amer79 and Marroquin v. United States.80 The issue before
the Court in Amer was one of first impression within the circuit, regarding the application of Padilla. Amer pled guilty to a drug related
charge and was subsequently eligible to be deported.81 After the decision in Padilla, Amer submitted a motion to vacate claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failing to advise

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 254.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 254.
Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 256.
Id. at 251 n.3.
681 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012).
480 F. App’x 294 (5th Cir. 2012).
Amer, 681 F.3d at 212.
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him of the potential of deportation.82
In order to determine whether Amer could prevail on his
claim, the Fifth Circuit first considered the guidelines set forth in
Teague in order to determine whether to retroactively apply the precedent set by the Court in Padilla.83 As previously stated, a rule is
“new,” and thus, not applied retroactively unless it was “dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”84 The court construed the decision in Padilla as a drastic departure from precedent, recognizing that prior to Padilla attorneys had
no duty to advise defendants of the potential consequence of deportation accompanying a guilty plea.85 Rather, counsel’s duty was previously limited to advising the defendant on the direct consequences of
the guilty plea, as opposed to collateral consequences, including immigration status.86 The court also noted that Padilla was not merely
an expansion of the Strickland test, but instead created a new basis on
which defendants may vacate their guilty pleas.87 Therefore, because
the court found Padilla to have created a new rule, it did not apply
the ruling retroactively to Amer’s claim.88
Likewise, the court in Marroquin found that Padilla created a
new rule, and thus, was not retroactive.89 Marroquin pled guilty to
transporting an illegal immigrant within the United States, and thus,
was subjected to immigration proceedings.90 She subsequently filed
a writ of coram nobis, citing Padilla as the basis for her ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and alleged that her attorney failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of her plea.91 Relying
squarely on the circuit court’s decision in Amer, the court upheld the
ruling that Padilla was a “new” rule within the meaning of Teague,
and thus, could not apply retroactively to Marroquin’s claim.92

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
Amer, 681 F.3d at 213-14.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id.
Marroquin, 480 F. App’x at 296.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
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Tenth Circuit

In United States v. Chang Hong,93 the Tenth Circuit addressed
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hong emigrated from
South Korea and became a permanent legal resident of the United
States.94 In 2007, he pled guilty to a drug possession and was subsequently subjected to immigration removal proceedings.95 In 2010,
Hong sought to vacate his conviction and withdraw his guilty plea,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.96 In his motion to vacate,
he claimed his attorney did not advise him of the potential deportation that accompanied his guilty plea.97 Hong’s motion was filed after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Padilla, and thus,
Hong used that decision as the basis for his claim.98
In determining whether to apply Padilla to Hong’s claim, the
court employed a three-step analysis to determine its retroactivity.99
This three-step analysis included whether the conviction was final at
the time Padilla was decided, whether Padilla created a “new rule,”
and finally, if that rule was in fact “new,” whether it fell within the
two exceptions to nonretroactivity.100 The court found the conviction
was final and also that the rule in Padilla was “new,” but that it did
not fall within the two prescribed exceptions.
In finding that Padilla created a “new rule,” the court reasoned that “[b]efore Padilla, most state and federal courts had considered the failure to advise a client of potential collateral consequences of a conviction to be outside the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment.”101 The court also considered the lack of unanimity in
the Supreme Court in rendering its landmark decision, citing both the
concurrence and dissent from Padilla.102 Based on these two opin93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

671 F.3d 1147 (2011).
Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1148.
Id. at 1148-49.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id.
Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1154-55.
In a concurrence, Justice Alito . . . stated ‘the Court’s decision marks a
major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law’ and noted the majority failed
to cite any precedent for the premise that a defense counsel’s failure to
provide advise concerning the immigration consequences of a criminal
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ions, the circuit court found it hard to believe that the Padilla rule
was “compelled or dictated by the Court’s prior precedent.”103 The
court in Hong further expressed its disapproval of the Third Circuit’s
holding in United States v. Orocio,104 which stated Padilla was an
“old rule,” and thus, could be retroactively applied on collateral review.105 In contrast to relying on the long-standing professional
norms argument as the Third Circuit did, the Tenth Circuit found Padilla created a new rule because “it applied Strickland to collateral
civil consequences of conviction—a line courts had never crossed before.”106 The court’s final argument to support its position of Padilla
creating a new rule was the distinction between “what it applies—
Strickland—[and] where it applies—collateral immigration consequences of a plea bargain.”107
Ultimately, the court did not find that Padilla applied to
Hong’s claim because as a “new rule” it needed to fall within the two
narrow exceptions in order to retroactively apply.108 The court stated
Padilla did not fall within the first exception because it did not create
a substantive rule, but instead a procedural one.109 The Tenth Circuit
also found that Padilla did not fall within the second exception either
because the Supreme Court had repeatedly refused to find a rule created to be so fundamental to criminal procedure that it should be
available retroactively.110 Thus, because the “new rule” of Padilla
did not fall within the prescribed exceptions, it could not be retroactively applied on collateral appeals and the Tenth Circuit denied
Hong’s motion.111

conviction violated a defendant’s right to counsel. . . . Similarly, Justice
Scalia in a dissent . . . argued the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does
not extend to ‘advice about the collateral consequences of conviction’
and that the Court, until Padilla, had limited the Sixth Amendment to
advice directly related to defense against criminal prosecutions. Id.
103
Chang Hong, 671 F.3d.at 1155.
104
645 F.3d 630 (2011).
105
Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1155. “[B]ecause Padilla followed directly form Strickland
and long-established professional norms, it is an “old rule” for Teague purposes and is retroactively applicable on collateral review.” Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641.
106
Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1155.
107
Id. at 1156.
108
Id. at 1157.
109
Id. (noting that because it was simply a change in the way an attorney advises a defendant before entering a guilty plea, it was only a procedural rule change).
110
Id. at 1157-58.
111
Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1159.
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Second Circuit and Civil Commitments

The Second Circuit did not hear a relevant immigration case
addressing whether Padilla could be applied retroactively, but instead
rendered a decision on an attorney’s failure to warn of the possibility
of civil commitment, comparing that consequence to deportation. In
United States v. Youngs,112 Youngs pled guilty to possessing child
pornography.113 During the plea hearing, the court explained the consequences of his plea, including the minimum and maximum jail sentences, the term of supervised release, and the registration as a sex offender.114 However, this plea colloquy did not include the potential
of civil commitment.115 Youngs argued that this failure to warn was
equivalent to an attorney failing to warn a noncitizen defendant of the
potential for deportation that often accompanies a guilty plea. 116 Although some consequences of guilty pleas had long been considered
collateral, and thus, do not require an explanation, Youngs argued
that after the decision in Padilla, the court should follow suit in removing the distinction between direct and collateral consequences.117
However, the Second Circuit rejected Youngs’s argument.
The court explained that Padilla was not persuasive in Youngs’s situation because deportation is a “nearly automatic” consequence,
whereas the possibility of civil commitment is a much more “remote
and uncertain consequence.”118 The court also departed from a recent
Eleventh Circuit decision which extended Padilla to “affirmative
misrepresentations by counsel regarding civil commitment.”119 That
case was distinguishable from Youngs because the holding in that decision was strictly limited to a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, whereas Youngs’ claim was directed at the
court for failing to warn him during the plea colloquy. 120 Ultimately,
the court held that the district court was not required to advise
Youngs of the possibility of civil commitment in order to uphold his

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

687 F.3d 56 (2012).
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Youngs, 687 F.3d at 60-61.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 62 n.4.
Id.
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guilty plea as knowing and voluntary.121 The court also advised that
although an allegation of a court’s failure to warn about the possibility of civil commitment cannot be brought based on Padilla, attorneys should not be discouraged from always advising their clients of
the potential consequences of guilty pleas, both collateral and direct.122
IV.

THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION AND THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The New York Constitution also includes a right to counsel,
similar to that of the United States Constitution. It provides: “In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . . .”123 Comparable to
the federal right to counsel, this state standard makes it clear a person
is entitled to counsel, but does not specify how that counsel must perform. In determining how adequate counsel’s performance must be,
New York courts rely on precedent from People v. Benevento,124
which set the threshold at “meaningful representation.”125 This
standard is objectively measured based on whether counsel used a
“reasonable and legitimate strategy under the circumstances” and not
simply whether the attorney won the case.126
New York courts also employ the Strickland two-prong test to
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient.127 In New
York, a defendant must satisfy the two prongs set forth in Strickland
in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.128
However, when the claim is analyzed under the New York State Constitution as opposed to the United States Constitution, the prejudice
test under Strickland is only examined in the general context of
whether counsel made an error that did not allow the defendant to
have a fair trial.129
Similar to the extension of Strickland through the Court’s de121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 63.
Youngs, 687 F.3d at 63 n.6.
NY CONST. art. I § 6.
697 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
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cision in Padilla, in People v. McDonald130 the right to effective assistance of counsel was expanded to include an attorney’s failure to
advise a defendant about the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea in New York. However, the standard established in McDonald
is not quite as broad as that of Padilla. In McDonald, a Jamaican
immigrant, who was a lawful permanent resident of the United States,
was charged with possessing and selling marijuana.131 Upon advice
of counsel, McDonald pled guilty to a lesser charge.132 Shortly after
sentencing, immigration proceedings were initiated against McDonald.133 Almost two months after the immigration proceedings commenced, McDonald’s counsel moved to vacate the judgment based on
his own ineffective assistance of counsel.134 Defense counsel stated
that he had “incorrectly advised [McDonald] that his guilty plea
‘would not result in deportation.’ ”135 Counsel also stated that
McDonald had maintained his innocence prior to entering the guilty
plea, and only entered such plea based on counsel’s “affirmative misstatements.”136
In analyzing whether McDonald satisfied the first prong of
the Strickland test for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
court stated that although the “mere failure to advise a defendant of
the possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel[,] . . . affirmative misstatements by defense counsel
may, under certain circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.”137 Because counsel admitted that he incorrectly informed
McDonald of his potential for deportation, the court found this prong
to be satisfied. However, in McDonald’s motion to vacate, it only
stated that he was misinformed by counsel, but not that, but for counsel’s misadvice, McDonald would not have pled guilty.138 Therefore,
the court found that the second prong of the Strickland test was not
satisfied, and thus, McDonald’s motion was denied.139
For almost a decade after McDonald, only affirmative mis130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132-33.
McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 133.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
Id.
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statements by counsel were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of
Strickland for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in regard to
deportation. However, after the decision in Padilla was handed
down, the New York courts began to apply the standard coming out
of that case, holding counsel responsible for a failure to advise on the
issue of deportation. Similar to the disagreement in federal courts,
the New York courts have also had a difficult time in coming to a
uniform decision on the retroactivity of Padilla.
V.

RETROACTIVITY IN NEW YORK COURTS
A.

Appellate Division Decisions

Similar to the circuit split in the federal judicial system, the
different departments of the Appellate Division in New York have
rendered inconsistent decisions when addressing the retroactivity of
Padilla.
1.

First Department

In the First Department, the court has addressed three cases
dealing with the retroactivity of Padilla. First, in People v. Hernandez,140 the court was extremely split in regard to the effect of Padilla
and three different opinions were submitted. Hernandez was a Dominican Republic native who pled guilty in 2007 to sexual abuse and
was consequently subject to deportation.141 He filed a motion to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but his
motion was denied by the lower court.142 The first concurring opinion stated that Hernandez sufficiently proved that his counsel had not
warned him of the immigration consequences of his plea, but he had
not established that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance.143 The opinion referred to the record which established that
Hernandez took the plea simply because it was his best option, and
not because his attorney had not advised him of his potential deporta-

140
141
142
143

950 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012).
Id. at 270-71 (Freedman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 268-69 (Sweeny, J., concurring).
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tion.144 Therefore, that concurring opinion chose not to address the
retroactivity of Padilla.145
The second concurring opinion in Hernandez also agreed that
Hernandez did not show any prejudice by his counsel’s deficient performance.146 This opinion again relied on the record which evidenced that Hernandez was dishonest when discussing his past criminal history, as well as this case.147 The second concurring opinion
also noted that Hernandez was not prejudiced because he had previously been convicted of a felonious assault which rendered him deportable, regardless of the outcome of this case.148 Therefore, that
opinion did not address Padilla or its retroactivity.
Finally, the dissenting opinion found that Hernandez had been
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.149 That opinion relied
heavily on the record and included the attorney’s testimony which
stated he did not remember whether he had discussed the immigration
consequences of the plea, but doubted it because it was not his usual
practice to do so.150 The dissenting judge believed that this lack of
advice would satisfy the first prong of Strickland.151 Furthermore, the
record stated that Hernandez was the “sole provider for and primary
caretaker of his six children.”152 Therefore, the dissenting judge stated it was likely Hernandez was prejudiced by the deficient performance of his counsel because he would have risked going to trial instead of being automatically deported and taken away from his
children “indefinitely.”153 Thus, the second prong of Strickland was
satisfied and Hernandez sufficiently made a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.154 Although this opinion did not address the retroactivity of Padilla, it is likely the dissenter would have found it to
be retroactive because he found Hernandez had established a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 269.
Hernandez, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (Sweeny, J., concurring).
Id. (Manzanet Daniels, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270 (Freedman, J., dissenting).
Hernandez, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (Freedman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 274-275.
Id. at 273, 275.
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In People v. Ogunmekan,155 the First Department refused to
address the retroactivity of Padilla or even look at whether the attorney provided advice on the immigration consequences of a plea until
the prejudice prong of Padilla was satisfied.
Even though
Ogunmekan pled guilty to a crime that would render him deportable
and it was unclear whether his counsel advised him of potential deportation, Ogunmekan failed to demonstrate that, but for his counsel
failing to advise him of this consequence, he would have went to trial.156 Thus the court did not go any further into determining “new”
versus “old” rules and the subsequent retroactive effect.157
Finally, in People v. Baret,158 the court addressed the issue of
retroactivity and came to a decision on the matter.159 Baret was convicted of selling a controlled substance, a crime that rendered him
deportable.160 Baret filed a motion to vacate claiming his attorney
was ineffective for failing to advise him of the deportation consequence of his conviction.161 The court used the standards set forth by
Strickland and found Padilla to apply retroactively to Baret’s motion.162 The court stated that “[w]hen a Supreme Court decision applies a well-established constitutional principle to a new circumstance, it is considered to be an application of an ‘old’ rule, and is
always retroactive.”163 In New York, the Court of Appeals had previously held that immigration status was a collateral consequence of a
conviction or plea, and thus, a failure to warn of this consequence
would not amount to ineffective assistance unless there was evidence
of actual misadvice.164 However, after Padilla, it was clarified that
Strickland must apply to giving advice on immigration consequences.165 Therefore, because Padilla was found to be retroactive, the
court held Baret was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the
advice his attorney gave him on the immigration consequences was
constitutionally deficient and if it was deficient, whether it was likely
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

945 N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012).
Id. at 60-61.
Id.
952 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012).
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id.
Baret, 952 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
Id.
Id.
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Baret would have went to trial instead of pleading.166
2.

Second Department

The Second Department has recently addressed one significant case on the matter of effective assistance of counsel and its relation to deportation.167 Picca was born in Italy, lived in France for
part of his childhood, and ultimately immigrated to the United States
where he became a lawful permanent resident.168 He had consistently
worked in the United States, as well as met and married an American
citizen and had children who are American citizens.169 In 2005, Picca
was charged with drug offenses and pled guilty, based on the advice
of counsel.170 The plea required Picca to enter a drug program, but he
relapsed shortly after his completion of the program and removal
proceedings were initiated.171 Picca submitted a motion to vacate his
conviction and claimed he was unaware of the immigration consequences of his plea.172
Similar to the other departments, the Second Department first
looked to Strickland to determine if Picca had satisfied the two-prong
test for ineffective assistance of counsel.173 The court also recognized, pursuant to Padilla, that failure of an attorney to warn about
immigration consequences or misadvising about these consequences
could constitute ineffective assistance.174 Picca attested that he was
unaware of the potential for deportation until his wife went out on her
own and consulted an immigration attorney.175 After determining
that this satisfied the first prong of Strickland, the court then turned to
whether the second prong was satisfied in a Padilla context.176 The
record contained evidence of Picca having substantial ties in the

166

Id.
People v. Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d 120 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012).
168
Id. at 122.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 123.
171
Id.
172
Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
173
Id. at 124-25.
174
Id. at 125.
175
Id. at 126.
176
Id. at 127 (noting that to satisfy the second prong of Strickland under Padilla, the defendant “must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances”) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485).
167
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United States, including a wife, family, and children.177 Taking these
facts into consideration, the court found that “the defendant’s averments sufficiently alleged that a decision to reject the plea offer, and
take a chance, however slim, of being acquitted after trial, would
have been rational.”178 Ultimately, the court found that Picca had satisfied the two prongs of Strickland, and thus, remanded the case for a
determination on Picca’s ineffective assistance claim.179 In a footnote, the court explained that it was not addressing the retroactivity of
Padilla because Picca’s “direct appeal was pending at the time the
[Padilla] decision . . . was rendered,” and thus, Picca was entitled to
apply that rule to his case.180
3.

Third Department

The Third Department has discussed three relevant cases in
the past year. In People v. Glasgow,181 Glasgow was a citizen of
Guyana, but had become a lawful permanent resident in the United
States.182 In 2005, he was charged with a drug offense and ultimately
pled guilty to a lesser charge.183 After removal proceedings were
subsequently initiated against Glasgow, he filed a motion to vacate
his conviction in order to remain in the country.184 He alleged his attorney had misinformed him of the potential immigration consequences that accompanied his guilty plea, and thus, violated his right
to effective counsel.185 Once again the court relied upon the federal
standard of Strickland’s two-prong test in order to determine if Glasgow’s claim of deprivation of meaningful representation was legitimate.186 In support of his argument, Glasgow explained that he had
spoken with his attorney about the possibility of removal, but the attorney summarily dismissed his concerns by suggesting that the risk
of deportation was minimal because he was a “small fish” in compar-

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 125 n.1.
943 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2012).
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Glasgow, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
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ison to other deportable criminals.187 Also significant to the court’s
decision was the fact that Glasgow’s attorney had testified that he had
advised his client on the likelihood of immigration consequences accompanying his guilty plea.188 The court ultimately found that because Glasgow had been “advised that removal was a possible consequence of his guilty plea, and was not misinformed to the contrary, he
did not establish that counsel failed to fulfill his obligations on this
issue or that his advice was deficient so as to satisfy . . . an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.”189 Simply because the attorney shared
his opinion on what he believed to be the likelihood of deportation,
and the court found to the contrary, he cannot be found to have provided constitutionally deficient assistance.190
Shortly after Glasgow, the Third Department decided People
v. Carty,191 another case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim was brought. Carty was not a citizen of the United States and
immigration proceedings were initiated after Carty pled guilty to the
charged drug offense.192 Carty moved to vacate his guilty plea on the
ground that neither his attorney, nor the court, advised him of the potential for his deportation.193 However, unlike the other cases discussed in which the defendants were known to be immigrants,
Carty’s background information stated that he was a United States
citizen even though he was not.194 Carty never took any steps to correct this mistake or to inform his attorney that he was not in fact a citizen of the United States.195 Consequently, his attorney never discussed the possibility of deportation with Carty because it appeared
to be irrelevant.196 Although the court did not go into an in-depth
analysis of the retroactivity of Padilla, the opinion included a footnote which stated that the Court in Padilla suggested its holding

187

Id.
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. (“The fact that counsel, in advising defendant to accept the favorable plea deal,
may have expressed his experience-based assessment of the likelihood that removal proceedings might or might not be initiated depending upon different factors was not misleading . . . .” Glasgow, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 676.).
191
947 N.Y.S.2d 617 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2012).
192
Id. at 618.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 619.
195
Id.
196
Carty, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
188
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should “apply to collateral challenges to final convictions.”197 Therefore, the court retroactively applied its principles to the case at hand
and found that only when “attorneys know that their clients face possible exile form this country and separation from their families” that
they are required to advise the defendant about immigration consequences.198 Therefore, Carty failed to prove that his counsel’s performance was deficient and the Third Department rejected his claim
accordingly.199
Finally, the Third Department heard People v. Haley200 in
June of 2012. Haley was a Guyanese immigrant who had become a
lawful permanent resident of the United States.201 In 2002, he pled
guilty to aggravated unlicensed operation of a vehicle and driving
while intoxicated.202 As a result of this plea, deportation proceedings
were initiated against Haley.203 In turn, Haley promptly filed a motion to vacate his conviction claiming his attorney had not advised
him of his possible deportation.204 The court explained that Haley
would have to satisfy the federal standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel created by Strickland in order to prevail on his claim to have
the conviction vacated.205 Without properly analyzing the issue of
retroactivity, the court presumed that the Court in Padilla intended
for its rule of law to be retroactively applied. 206 However, Haley had
previous convictions on his record that rendered him a deportable alien notwithstanding the conviction at issue; therefore, under Strickland and Padilla, the court could not have found that Haley was prejudiced by the failure of his attorney to warn him of his possible
deportation.207

197

Id. at 619 n.3.
Id. at 620 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484).
199
Id. at 620-21.
200
946 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2012).
201
Id. at 679.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Haley, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
206
Id.
207
Id. “[R]egardless of whether defendant pleaded guilty to the charges . . . , had been
found guilty after trial or had been acquitted, his status as a deportable alien would not have
been affected.” Id.
198
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Appellate Term

In People v. Hassan,208 the Appellate Term addressed a similar ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the effect of Padilla.209
Hassan was charged with a drug offense to which he subsequently
pled guilty.210 Thereafter, Hassan filed a motion to vacate his conviction on the grounds of his attorney’s misadvice in regards to the immigration consequences of his plea.211 As an initial matter, the Appellate Term observed that in order for any defendant to prevail on
such a claim, he must either satisfy the federal standard set forth in
Strickland or the New York standard of “meaningful representation”
set forth in Benevento.212 Because Hassan claimed he specifically
asked his attorney about the potential immigration consequences of
his plea and his attorney assured him there would not be any repercussions, Hassan satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.213
Hassan also satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test by and
through his claim that had his attorney informed him of the potential
consequence of deportation, he would have taken the risk and proceeded to trial.214 In determining that Strickland was satisfied, in adherence with the Third Department’s approach in Glasgow, the court
held that it need not determine the retroactivity of Padilla.215
VI.

PUTTING THE QUESTION TO REST: CHAIDEZ

The United States Supreme Court recently put to rest the
questions surrounding the retroactive application of the precedent established by the Court in Padilla in Chaidez v. United States.216 The
Court granted certiorari to this case after the Seventh Circuit concluded that, although Padilla created a new rule, it could not be applied retroactively because it did not fit squarely within one of the
two exceptions identified in Teague.
208

No. 2010-2643, at *1 (N.Y. Sept. 13, 2012).
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. (noting that Hassan satisfied the two prongs of Strickland, and thus, the court did
not need to consider the New York standard of “meaningful representation”).
213
Hassan, No. 2010-2643 at *1.
214
Id.
215
Id. at *2.
216
133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
209
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Chaidez was a native Mexican who moved to the United
States and became a lawful permanent resident.217 In 2003, she was
indicted for mail fraud and charged with an aggravated felony because the fraud caused a loss exceeding $10,000.218 Relying upon her
counsel’s advice, Chaidez entered a guilty plea and immigration removal proceedings were initiated subsequent to the entry of her sentence.219 Seeking to vacate her conviction in order to remain in the
country, Chaidez filed a writ of coram nobis in which she claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.220 Padilla was decided while this writ
was pending review.221 In the subsequent review of Chaidez’s writ,
the district court found Padilla to be a mere “application of the
Court’s holding in Strickland . . .;”222 thus, it was an “old rule” that
could be retroactively applied to Chaidez’s case.223 Consequently,
the district court considered the merits of Chaidez’s writ of coram
nobis and ultimately vacated her conviction.224
On appeal, the government argued against the district court’s
retroactive application of Padilla.225 In its decision, the Seventh Circuit cited to language from Padilla in which the Court “[n]ot[ed] that
it had ‘never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional assistance required under Strickland.’ ”226 Likewise, the court
observed that many federal district courts, as well as circuit courts,
had all held, prior to Padilla, that counsel was not required under the
Sixth Amendment to provide information about collateral, as opposed
to direct, consequences of a guilty plea.227 Using this rationale, because Strickland did not include a requirement to advise a client
about immigration consequences, it follows that Padilla created a
“new rule” that “constitutionally effective assistance of counsel requires advice about a civil penalty imposed by the Executive
217

Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1105-06.
219
Id. at 1106.
220
Id.
221
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106.
222
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686.
223
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 687 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
227
Id. at 690.
218
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Branch . . . after the criminal case is closed.”228
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s
decision, finding that, based on the framework set forth by Teague,
Padilla was a “new rule,” and thus, not retroactive.229 The Court noted Padilla would have been considered an “old rule” if it simply clarified that a lawyer would be considered ineffective if he or she did
not inform the defendant of the potential for deportation.230 However, the Court instead concluded that Padilla created a prerequisite to
the Strickland test.231 It established that a court must first look to
whether the Strickland test is appropriate to apply before determining
whether the counsel’s performance was ineffective.232 Because the
Court found it to be the initial inquiry, it stated “[i]f that does not
count as breaking new ground or imposing a new obligation, we are
hard pressed to know what would.”233 Therefore, as a “new rule,”
Padilla may not be used retroactively to overturn a conviction for a
defendant, including Chaidez, whose conviction became final before
Padilla.234
Tara M. Breslawski*

228
Id. at 693. “Under Teague, a rule is old only if it sets forth the sole reasonable interpretation of existing precedent.” Id. at 692. Although it would seem that Padilla is just an
example of Strickland being applied to a specific set of facts and thus is just an extension of
Strickland, Padilla is sufficiently novel and should be held to have created an entirely separate and new rule. Id. at 692-93.
229
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105.
230
Id. at 1108.
231
Id. “Padilla had to develop new law, establishing that the Sixth Amendment applied at
all, before it could assess the performance of Padilla’s lawyer under Strickland.” Id. at 1111.
232
Id. at 1110.
233
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. (internal quotation marks omitted).
234
Id. at 1113.
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